




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Ethnicity and religion in Tatarstan and the Volga–Ural region

DAVID C. LEWIS

Conflicts between Russians and Tatars

A landmark in the development of Russian imperialism was the fall of Kazan' to Ivan the Terrible in 1552. Four years later the fall of Astrakhan consolidated Russian domination over the Volga river and provided a major foundation for subsequent Russian expansion into Siberia, Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

Having been forcibly incorporated into the Russian Empire, some of the Volga Tatars have attempted to retain what they could of their distinctive national identity. Two prominent vehicles for Tatar cultural identity were language and religion. Their language is a Turkic one, related to but distinct from Crimean Tatar. Among the other Turkic languages, Bashkort (that is, Bashkir) is quite close to Tatar and is sometimes regarded by Tatar nationalists as merely a 'dialect' of Tatar—a description rejected by many Bashkorts who are keen to retain their own ethnic distinctiveness. Actually, the Bashkorts were helped in this by Stalin's 'divide and rule policy' which gave an independent status to the Bashkorts and hindered their assimilation by the Tatars. In the 1989 Soviet census 6,645,588 people were listed as Tatars, 1,449,157 as Bashkorts and a further 268,793 as Crimean Tatars. (Many of the latter live in Central Asian cities because of the mass deportation of Crimean Tatars in May 1944 when Stalin feared lest they should collaborate with the Turks against the Russians.)

For some Tatars, religion is also an important medium for ethnic identity. The conversion of the Tatars and Bashkorts to Islam occurred between the 10th and 14th centuries, but an allegiance to Islam was partly reinforced by Russian attempts at Christianization. During the 17th to 19th centuries, there were rather crude attempts to convert the Tatars to Russian Orthodoxy through coercion and tax inducements. At times the Russians destroyed the mosques but every time the Tatars returned to build new places of Islamic worship. This policy of Russification pursued by the Tsars had little long-term success but led to an intensification of bitterness and antagonisms towards the Russians among many Tatars.

About 10 percent of the Tatars did become Russian Orthodox, although Muslim Tatars like to claim that the ancestors of these converts were actually

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pagans living in the area rather than Muslims. In any case, these Orthodox Tatars have now become almost an ethnic group in themselves, having their own distinctive customs, dress and language. They often have their own separate villages—for instance in the west of Bashkortostan, in the districts of Bakali and Tyumazi near the border with Tatarstan. To a large extent they have tended to intermarry among themselves, and not with other Tatars or even with Russians. They also speak a form of the Tatar language which is often incomprehensible to ordinary (nominally Muslim) Tatars because of the absence of Arabic loan expressions and of Arabic-based words for biblical names.¹

For the Muslim Tatars, religion also played a dominant role in the formation of a distinctive ethnic consciousness. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, Kazan' was one of the four or five major centres of Islamic learning, attracting prominent Muslim scholars from all over the world and becoming one of the leading centres of Islamic revival in the world. Its Islamic University had about 12,000 students in 1913, including hundreds from many other Muslim countries. Every year more than 400 books were published in the city, their total circulation exceeding four million.² In 1906 a 'Muslim Union', also known as the 'Union of Russian Muslims', was founded in St Petersburg and 11 of its 15 Central Committee members were Volga Tatars. Even today, a sense of identity between nationalism and religion is illustrated by the comment of a woman wearing an Islamic crescent pendant whom I met in Moscow. When I took the liberty of asking about her nationality, she at first replied, 'I am a Muslim', and only after further questioning stated that she was Tatar.

The Volga Tatars also had a leading economic position among the Muslims of the Russian Empire. Often they acted as intermediaries for Russian industrialists or partners for Central Asian landlords. They were further distinguished among the Muslims by their having developed a native middle-class capable of influencing economic progress and participating in social change. There were Tatar intellectuals who were considerably influenced by European ideas, were keen to know about scientific advances elsewhere, and were deeply aware of their own needs for educational reform. At the same time, they felt a need to unify the Turkic peoples of the Russian Empire and directed many of their cultural and ideological efforts towards this goal.³

Therefore it is not surprising that the Communists should have regarded Tatar nationalism as a threat. Their attempts at Russification were in some ways more thorough than those practised during parts of the Tsarist period. The Tatar language was little used in schools, especially at higher levels of education, so that younger generations of urban Tatars often grew up speaking Russian more fluently and naturally than Tatar. Many of them have next to no knowledge of the Tatar language, although some of them seem to regret this fact. For instance, a Tatar man who heard me introducing myself in Tatar during a local television interview in 1991 afterwards commented that he felt ashamed that this English man knew more of the Tatar language than he did.

The Communists also suppressed virtually all public expressions of religiosity, whether Islamic, Christian or other. In Kazan', only one functioning mosque was

left open during the Soviet period. However, in recent years there has been a revival of Tatar nationalism which has sometimes combined politics with religion. For instance, in 1990 an Islamic Revival Party was formed which had mainly Tatars on its committee and first met in the Tatar city of Astrakhan. Another political party, named *Ittifaq* (Unity), has been formed in Tatarstan itself. It staged a series of public demonstrations in Kazan' during 1991 and 1992, calling for the independence of Tatarstan from Russia. Their leader, Fauziya Bairamova, was outspoken in mentioning that the Tatars never concluded a peace treaty with Ivan the Terrible, so are technically still at war with the Russians: therefore, the Tatars are entitled to take whatever measures might be necessary in order to reclaim their independence.⁴ In the face of such rhetoric, it is not surprising that Bairamova was later arrested on charges of provoking public unrest.

Intermarriage and Tatar identity

Four centuries of close contact between the Russians and Tatars have led to many cases of intermarriage between them. This is acknowledged by a Russian proverb which says: 'Scratch a Russian and underneath you'll find a Tatar'. Over the centuries a certain amount of intermingling between the Europeans and Asiatic peoples of this region has resulted in the Volga Tatars having a wide range of outward appearances, from those with fair skin and blue eyes to those with more Central Asiatic features.

However, on the basis of outward appearance it is difficult or impossible to distinguish most Tatars from Russians. Often their dress, types of accommodation, furnishings and other external characteristics are also indistinguishable from those of most Russians. Therefore a repertoire of symbols is still available, although limited in number, for use as cultural markers to distinguish Tatars from Russians. Predominant among these, as mentioned already, are language and religion.

Even these, however, are not necessarily sufficient in themselves, because many younger Tatars, especially in the cities, speak Russian better than Tatar and, as a legacy of Communist atheism, do not regard themselves as having any particular religion. For at least some Tatars with whom I have discussed such issues, it seems that what basically defines their Tatar identity is the fact that they have 'Tatar' written as their nationality in their passports.⁵

In Tatarstan itself, Russians are the majority ethnic group in several major cities, such as Kazan', Zelenodol'sk, Bugul'ma, Chistopol' and Yelabuga. Elsewhere Tatars often constitute the locally predominant ethnic group, especially in smaller cities and *raion* centres. This can be seen from the statistics presented in the appendix.

Among those mixed marriages known to me, it appears to be more common for a Russian man to marry a Tatar woman than vice versa. This impression is borne out by a study conducted in Ufa, where the Tatars—who constitute about 27 per cent of the city's population—have the highest proportion of those who

prefer marriage to a partner of the same nationality. The percentage is higher among the men than among the women, because 60 per cent of Tatar men but only 50 per cent of Tatar women expressed a preference for a Tatar spouse.⁶ However, one problem with interpreting these statistics is that Ufa is the capital of Bashkortostan (Bashkiria), where the Bashkorts constitute a further 11.3 per cent of the city's population. In view of the relatively close cultural and linguistic links between Tatars and Bashkorts, there are some local residents who tend to minimize the distinctions between these two groups. I do not know if this attitude is more pronounced among women, but it was certainly typified by a group of women whom I met in Ufa. When I asked them if they were Bashkorts or Tatars, they replied, 'We're all the same, all mixed up together', and they refused to categorize themselves as one or the other ethnic group.

In Kazan', the capital of Tatarstan, about one in three marriages are of mixed nationality.⁷ Many others in the city who regard themselves as either Tatars or Russians also have grandparents or other relatives of a different nationality. However, even if the offspring are officially either Tatars or Russians, they are aware that in themselves they are of mixed descent.

Nowadays it is possible to choose which nationality would be adopted by the children of mixed marriages. Often the choice has been governed by the nationality of the father, whose surname would also be adopted. However, during the Communist period (and to a certain extent also in contemporary Russia) it has often been thought to be more advantageous for children of mixed marriages to promote their Russian identity, especially as Russian was the principal language used for their education.

To some extent Communism helped to reduce religious conflicts within families of mixed nationalities, in so far as atheism became the official ideology—one might like to say 'religion'—of many people. With the current religious freedoms, children of mixed marriages now have a choice to make regarding which, in any, religion they might want to adopt too. If the parents subscribe to a religion at all, even if only nominally, do the children follow the Islamic faith of the Tatar parent or the Orthodox Christianity of the Russian parent? An example of such a dilemma is that which was faced by a young woman named Dina.

Baha'is

As a child, Dina was torn between two religions. Her Tatar grandmother secretly taught her Islamic prayers but her Russian grandmother secretly had her baptized. Each warned Dina never to tell her other grandmother. They each told her that the other grandmother would kill her for not following the same religion as that grandmother.

Throughout her childhood and teens Dina pretended to her Tatar grandmother that she was a Muslim and to her Russian grandmother that she was a Christian. Finally, her inner conflicts were resolved when she heard about the Baha'i faith. This was a religion which respected both Christianity and Islam. When Dina

became a Baha'i, she found a faith which encouraged her to respect both Jesus and Mohammed and to study both Christian and Islamic scriptures as well as Baha'i writings. Her conflict between ethnic identity and religious faith seemed to have been resolved.

Until recently the Baha'i religion had hardly penetrated the former Soviet Union at all, except for a small group who had been living in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan, until their activities were suppressed under Stalin and their meeting place closed down. Recently, however, the Baha'i religion has been reintroduced from the West. For instance, through some American Baha'is Professor Daniel Pivovarov of Yekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk) became a Baha'i too. He currently teaches courses on religion at the Urals State University, giving him the opportunity to invite guest speakers from a variety of religious groups. When some Canadian Baha'is came in 1991, about 300 people attended their presentation, some of whom then became Baha'is.

There are now Baha'is living in at least 120 cities of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but the number is rapidly increasing. In about 50 cities there are sufficient numbers of Baha'is to form 'Local Spiritual Assemblies', each assembly requiring nine Baha'is over the age of 21. Throughout the whole Commonwealth there are probably between 2,000 and 2,500 Baha'is, but exact figures are not available at present.⁸

The Baha'is of Kazan' are responsible for propagating their faith throughout the Volga region, the Ural mountains and western Siberia. To some extent they are helped in this by Western volunteers, who are known in Baha'i jargon as 'Pioneers' because they do not like to be called Baha'i 'missionaries'. In Kazan', the chairman of the 'Local Spiritual Assembly' is a Tatar man named Shamil Fattakhov. Shamil's first encounter with the Baha'i faith was in 1989, through a group of 62 American Baha'is who came to Kazan' and needed an interpreter—particularly for an interview at the TV studio where Shamil works. After Shamil interpreted for them, he was given some books on the Baha'i faith.

Prior to this, Shamil had been visiting mosques and churches for his television programme but was not attracted by what he saw. When he looked at the books about the Baha'i religion, however, he found that they fitted with a number of ideas on religion which he had already begun to formulate for himself. At first he had several objections to the religion, but over the next few months he had more and more contact with the Baha'is and eventually came to a point where he accepted the new religion for himself.

Some Tatars have remarked that Shamil ought to be killed for his apostasy from Islam, but Shamil does not take such threats seriously. It might be that the Baha'i faith poses less of a threat to Muslims than the conversion of Tatars to Christianity, to be discussed in a later section.

Islam

On a Friday lunchtime at a small mosque in Yekaterinburg (formerly Sverdlovsk), 42 men gather for prayer. In a separate house behind the mosque,

about a dozen women pray separately, but through a loudspeaker on the wall of the room where they meet they can hear what is going on in the main mosque.

The mosque has been open for eight years. Previously, the devout Muslims—most of whom were elderly people—had held their services at the Muslim cemetery outside the city. It had entailed a two hours' bus journey and then a walk on foot. Even during the winter months they had faithfully continued to perform their prayers outside in the snow.

Now they have a mosque in the city, although it is inconveniently located about three or four kilometres from the nearest bus stop. The mullah is not sure whether or not the discontinuation of a previous bus route had anything at all to do with the presence of the mosque.

Mullah Hazrat had been brought up in a devout Muslim family. His grandfather had been a lecturer in Islamic culture who possessed a large library with many copies of the Koran. As a child, Hazrat had studied at home for five years instead of going to the state school, until the city authorities visited his father and forbade the tuition of religious topics. Hazrat continued to study Islam by himself from older people and from some staff of the Spiritual Directorate for Muslims in the Russian Federation.

This mosque in Yekaterinburg caters for the nominally Muslim Tatar and Bashkort population, but only a tiny proportion of the Tatars actually attend this mosque. Yekaterinburg's combined Tatar and Bashkort population amounts to about 65,000—about 5 per cent of the city's population.

Even in Kazan', where Tatars account for just over 40 per cent of the city's population, mosque attendance is still relatively low. Farid Heidar al Salmani, who is in charge of religious education at the city's main mosque, claimed that during the month of Ramadan about 30,000 to 35,000 Muslims attend one of the four functioning mosques in Kazan'. He said that for other special festivals attendance is about 15,000 to 16,000, while on a usual Friday about 5,000 to 6,000 people attend mosque. However, independent observers consider these figures to be exaggerated: on an average Friday lunchtime only about 300 men and 200 women attend the city's main mosque. For the important festival of Kurban Bayram—known in Arabic as the feast of 'Id—over a thousand Tatars did attend an open-air service, but this was certainly exceptional.

Since 1988 the main mosque in Kazan' has been organizing classes on Islam for teenagers and children. The sexes are kept separated, but the total number of boys studying at two different mosques is no more than about 100.

To a certain extent Islam is being used as a means for cultural revival and reaffirmation of national identity among at least some Tatars. However, after some 70 years of atheistic propaganda, most Tatars have only a 'nominal' allegiance to Islam and most of them know very little about Islamic belief or practice.⁹

During the Soviet period, the Tatars, Bashkorts and other Muslims of the Russian Federation were under the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Directorate which has its headquarters in the Bashkort city of Ufa. Recently, however, conflicts among Muslims in Russia have led to the establishment of a separate Mufti

(spiritual leader) for Tatarstan. Ostensibly the cause of the split was the depiction of Christian and Jewish symbols on a new Tatar mosque in Naberezhnye-Chelny, a city in Eastern Tatarstan. However, local observers think that it developed more as an expression of political manoeuvring and power struggles among the more religious Tatars.

In August 1992 Gabdul Galiulli was chosen as the new Mufti for Tatarstan. His appointment set him up as a rival Mufti to Talgat Tadzhuiddin, who continues in office and maintains his claim to be the spiritual leader for all the Muslims in European Russia and Siberia. Although Talgat's official residence is in Ufa, in Bashkortostan, he himself is a Tatar and was educated in Tatarstan.

The religious conflict arose over depiction of the crescent moon, the cross and the Star of David, all together, on the upper windows of a new mosque in Naberezhnye-Chelny. Talgat had seen such symbols on mosques in Turkey and wanted to incorporate them into this new mosque as symbols of tolerance and respect for different religious traditions. However, Talgat's opponents saw in this their opportunity to set up a rival political (or religious) organization. They protested against the use of the cross and the Star of David, wanting only the crescent moon—which is widely regarded as a symbol of Islam. Even though the offending symbols were removed, the pretext was sufficient for a new Mufti to be elected.¹⁰

The recent establishment of a separate Muftiate for Tatarstan entails many political, economic and even commercial factors because large sums of money pass through the hands of the Mufti and of the Spiritual Directorate, including money from Islamic states such as Saudi Arabia. In Ufa there had been allegations of corruption through the Mufti pocketing certain sums for his own use: visitors to the headquarters of the Spiritual Directorate certainly wondered about the Mercedes and other expensive foreign cars parked outside.

The Mufti also gave grants to enable certain pious Muslims to go on the *haj*—the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina. Nowadays the pilgrim has to find half of the cost himself and the mosques might supply the other half from grants they have received from Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. Obviously the ability to allocate such grants confers power within the Islamic community. Recently there have been reports that the economic resources available to the Muslim clergy have been used to induce Tatars to observe the fast of Ramadan. Those keeping the fast are said to have each received walnuts and three kilos of raisins from the mosque.

Within Tatarstan itself, some local mosques support Talgat Tadzhuiddin and others support Gabdul Galiulli. Their loyalties are not necessarily constant, but can change according to whichever Mufti helps them. Both Muftis are recognized by the government. Yuri Mikhailov, a Russian who works for the office of religious affairs in the Kazan' Kremlin, said that they would prefer to deal with one centralized authority rather than with several, but this process is now independent of whatever the government thinks. It is a religious situation and not a state one, so they had to register Mufti Gabdul Galiulli, and the state could not

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refuse registration when they brought along the proper documents. Therefore both Muftis now have their own representatives in Kazan'.

In his interview with me in 1991, Farid Heidar al Salmani said the Arabs 'talk a lot about help but don't give it', despite visits to his mosque by five or six delegations from Saudi Arabia. However, in 1992 and 1993 substantial grants for rebuilding mosques were either given or promised by some Muslim states, as indicated by the beginnings of ambitious mosque construction projects in Kazan', Naberezhnye-Chelny, Nizhnyekamsk and elsewhere in Tatarstan. Perhaps because of rapidly rising costs, all these projects appear to have come to a virtual standstill during 1994, with the foundations or shell being left empty.

Nevertheless, the numbers of different Muslim organizations have been mushrooming, and now exceed 400—as compared with just 18 prior to 1985. The 'official' Muslims in Kazan' feel threatened by the Ahmadi sect, because the Ahmadis have better quality literature—some printed in London and other literature printed locally on a high quality printing machine imported from the West.

Farid Heidar al Salmani also admits to feeling threatened by Christianity. He says:

Recently a new process of Christianization has begun. It is a big problem because the schools are not differentiated by religion but Christians go into the schools and try to influence the children. Muslims cannot give the Koran free of charge but Christians give the Bible to children as a free book because many foreign Christian organizations help the Christians here.

Archbishop Anastasi of Kazan' and Mari told me that such evangelism has been conducted mainly by Protestant groups, because the Orthodox clergy do not enter schools in an official capacity as priests. However, because the Orthodox Church is the most visible one, the Muslims tend to assume that any proselytization has been done by the Orthodox Church.

Russian Orthodoxy

To a large extent, the Orthodox faith is regarded as the religion of the Russians, although it of course also embraces a number of other non-Russian peoples. Since *perestroika*, divisions within the Orthodox Church have become much more obvious. Within Orthodoxy, there is a wide range of opinion and practice, but as a rough generalization it might be said that those priests who were part of the official establishment during the Communist period have tended to remain conservative whereas younger priests are much more open to change.

Of course, there are exceptions to this generalization. For instance, in 1994 a younger bishop named Nikon was appointed as new archbishop of the diocese of Yekaterinburg and Verkhoturye. He did not graduate from a seminary but received theological education from a priest known to have been a KGB informer. His mercurial rise within the church is considered by some to be

further evidence that his was a political appointment, engineered by the Ministry of State Security (the successor to the KGB).

In Yekaterinburg, some conflict between parts of the Orthodox hierarchy and some Protestants came to the surface in September 1994, when eight different Protestant churches invited a Finnish evangelist named Kalevi Lehtinen to conduct some public meetings. A number of Orthodox Christians also took part in the mission, but most of the official hierarchy refused to cooperate. Nikon himself persistently found reasons to avoid Lehtinen's request for a meeting together. Meanwhile, some ultra-conservative Orthodox people—self-styled 'Cossacks' descended from disbanded Cossack groups—staged demonstrations outside Lehtinen's meetings. Their placards announced their belief that Russians should only be Orthodox and that all other religions are heresies. For them, ethnicity and religion were regarded as virtually coterminous.

By contrast, other Orthodox believers in the city regarded the hierarchy's stance as bigoted and narrow-minded. For instance, Tanya Osintseva, who for eight years had been secretary to Nikon's predecessor, has been active in developing interdenominational cooperation. With the help of the local government department of religious affairs, Tanya helped to organize an interdenominational charitable effort at Christmas to help orphans and poor people. This project, which involved Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant churches, was widely publicized in the local press and obviously met with public approval. In less overt ways, lay Orthodox people have also cooperated with other denominations in projects, such as visiting prisoners or helping care for orphans and abandoned children.

For the most part, the Russian Orthodox Church has maintained an amicable relationship with the Muslims, in so far as neither have threatened the other's own sphere of operations. Although Farid Heidar al Salmani in Kazan' claimed that several Russians had become Muslims, it seems that these are Russian wives of Tatar men and that the wives supposed 'conversions' might be rather superficial.

However, in Ufa I met an Orthodox priest named Boris Razveyev through whom several Tatars and Bashkorts from at least nominally Muslim backgrounds have been converted to Russian Orthodoxy. For instance, one Bashkort young man told me how he had become a Christian in 1990 and since then he had become actively involved in the life of the Orthodox church where Boris ministers.

Razveyev himself is unusual in several other respects. He spent the first six years of his life (from 1949 to 1955) in a labour camp in the cold Magadan province of north-eastern Siberia, where his parents were prisoners. In the 1970s, Boris became a hippy but later became a Christian after a mystical experience and also through contact with the 'underground' Orthodox church. His subsequent activities in the underground Orthodox church led to the KGB preventing him from continuing his studies in law at university, and later finding an excuse to have him imprisoned. Now that he has finally been allowed to enter the priesthood, he has a special ministry to prisoners because he understands

their needs—and knows how to slip them a packet of tea when the warders are not looking!¹¹

The Church of the Birth of Our Lady, where Boris ministers, is also unusual in the way that Boris encourages a relaxed atmosphere during the services. In contrast to most Orthodox churches, the congregation at the Church of the Birth of Our Lady consists of predominantly younger people, from all walks of life: about three-quarters of the congregation are less than 40 years old. At the end of 1991 the average Sunday congregation was about 30 to 40 people and by the following spring it had grown to about 80. Then in the autumn of 1992 many people with no previous church contacts began to come to the church. In 1993 an average Sunday congregation numbered about 400 to 500 people, increasing to between 700 and 1,000 people for special festivals. This rapid growth was largely connected with a series of miracles which occurred during the autumn of 1992. For about three months some of the icons in the church inexplicably wept holy oil. When this was used for anointing people, many miraculous healings and exorcisms were reported. One man, for instance, had a large lump on the back of his head which was going to be surgically removed. He was anointed on his forehead and received prayer. The swelling then completely disappeared, so that the operation was no longer necessary. Another case is that of Nadezhda Savateyeva, who used to wear thick-lensed glasses but after being anointed with holy oil can now see an aeroplane in the sky.¹²

Whatever one thinks of these claimed miracles, and however one might try to explain them, the reports of these events have had an influence in the local community. One effect has been a dramatic drop in the local crime rate. Previously, when the building was used as a cinema, the small park next to it was often a scene of drunkenness and crime. That district of the city was known to contain a large number of criminals, but in 1992 the crime rate throughout that whole area fell to a tenth of its previous level. When Boris cited this statistic to me, he commented that the police themselves were very surprised at the change which had taken place.

For the most part, the Christians in Bashkortostan are not experiencing problems with the Muslims apart from a few isolated, personal incidents. In Bashkortostan as a whole the Bashkorts account for about 22 per cent of the population and the Tatars 28 per cent, so the Muslims constitute about half the total population. It is difficult to say why in Bashkortostan there has been relatively little negative reaction from the Muslims, as compared with their reactions in Tatarstan. Perhaps the conversions are not so well known, or else the Muslims are not so well organized as a pressure group. Another explanation might be that the Bashkorts have a reputation for being more tolerant and less fanatical about religion than the Tatars. The Bashkorts were converted to Islam at a later date than the Tatars, and it seems as if their ethnic identity is less closely tied up with a religious identity than appears to be the case among some of the Tatars.

The relatively peaceful coexistence of ethnic groups in Bashkortostan is said to have been one reason for the choice of Ufa (rather than Kazan') as the

headquarters of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for European Russia and Siberia. Mosques are being rebuilt or newly constructed throughout the region, largely with financial help from Islamic countries of the Middle East, but the Mufti, Talgat Tadzhuiddin, has generally encouraged understanding and co-operation between different religious groups in the area. Perhaps this was one reason why he advocated the use of different religious symbols for the new mosque in Naberezhnye Chelny.

Conflicts with Protestants

In Tatarstan, however, there have been conflicts between Tatar nationalists and some Protestant groups. In November 1993 the mayors of Kazan' and Naberezhnye-Chelny banned the use of public buildings by religious groups—restrictions aimed particularly at some of the Protestant churches who lack their own buildings. Over a year previously, local Christians had heard that Muslims in Kazan' wanted to bring pressure on the local government to introduce legislation of this kind, because all the rapidly growing and more lively churches in the city have had to use such halls because they have no buildings of their own.

One of the events which has provoked these new restrictions on the use of public buildings by religious groups was the conversion of a Muslim young man to Christianity. However, the new Christian's aunt is an influential member of the Tatar Public Centre, an aggressively nationalistic political party among the Tatars.

Immediately the Tatar Public Centre launched an 'anti-cult' crusade, aimed particularly against the church which this ex-Muslim had joined—a charismatic congregation pastored by a Ukrainian named Alexander Polishchuk. For three months, commencing in January 1993, demonstrators blocked the entrance to the public building which the church had been renting for their services. Some church members who tried to enter the building were harassed and physically beaten up. Although members of the Tatar Public Centre were involved in these demonstrations, it is unclear whether or not their actions had the official backing of the party itself.

I interviewed Yuri Mikhailov, of the Council for Religious Affairs in Kazan', and asked him about the effects of these restrictions. At first (perhaps a little defensively) he pointed out the relevant section of the Russian law which allows the right of religious activities in private homes, prayer houses, mosques and other such buildings, but does not guarantee access to public buildings for such purposes. Yuri went on to say that in the past they only had two Protestant organisations to deal with—the Baptists and the Seventh Day Adventists—and they continue to have positive relationships with these groups. However, in the last two to three years many other Protestant organizations—particularly charismatic ones—emerged which had no meeting places of their own but began to rent Palaces of Culture. 'We did not disturb them or refuse them access to such public buildings', said Yuri, 'but the number of Palaces of Culture stayed the same. Initially there was just one group but soon there were five, and then others

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came too. The state is limited in what it can provide, and these places were not intended for worship, but instead for concerts and similar kinds of cultural activities. So we tell the religious groups to buy property for their own use: they can do what they want there.'

Yuri went on to say that the legislation was directed particularly against a Christian cult named the Spirit of Life Church. This was formed in 1990 after an evangelistic campaign by an American evangelist named Bob Weiner, who insisted on starting his own congregation with the new converts. Rather than staying in the city to teach them himself, Weiner appointed as the new pastor a Christian of Jewish background named Nikolai Solomonov, who at the time was a student in his late teens. Gradually the new congregation began to acquire a reputation for being almost like a cult in the way in which it seemed to put excessive pressures on its members. Most of the converts were teenagers and students. Some of their parents began to accuse the church of brainwashing their children and even of encouraging the children to steal valuables from their parents in order to help the church's finances. A police investigation was launched and Solomonov went into hiding.

According to Yuri Mikhailov, one of the main problems with the Spirit of Life Church was the fact that the Council for Religious Affairs was receiving complaints from parents of converts aged less than 18 years. 'Over the age of eighteen', explained Yuri, 'people can be citizens of the state and can become pastors or religious officials, but until the age of 18 they can only attend church with the consent of their parents. Solomonov, the pastor of the Spirit of Life Church, stopped studying at the university and did not work. He wanted to start a new church with people of his own age and he told people to stop studying at university: this is bad. By contrast, other pastors encourage young people to study well.' Yuri Mikhailov went on:

A second complaint against the Spirit of Life Church was that children were now leaving home and stopped having contact with their parents. Parents came here, to our office, and cried. Some went to the Procurator and asked: 'Where is my son or daughter?'. Some had gone as far as Moscow. So we took action and refused to allow them to use the Palaces of Culture. I won't communicate with Solomonov and won't move from my position, even though we've had about 30 journalists here asking questions about the situation.

Another cause of complaint was that Tatars also went to this church. They attracted young Tatar boys and girls and some Tatar parents didn't like this: they wanted their children to go to the mosque and didn't want to allow Solomonov to take away their children if the children were not of age to decide for themselves. In this the borderline between nationality and religion is very thin.

Therefore at least one of the influencing factors was the way in which ethnicity and religion are closely associated with each other. People feel threatened if these boundaries are violated.

Yuri Mikhailov tried to give the impression that other churches were not seriously affected by the restrictions on their use of public buildings. However, an innocent victim of the bad publicity and the bans on renting public halls is

the 'Cornerstone' church, which has a regular Sunday attendance of about 800 people. It was founded in 1988 by a young couple in the Pentecostal church named Sergei and Julia Borisenkov. They had taken advantage of the new freedoms in Russia to talk with people who were asking questions about spiritual issues but had no experience of Christianity. Sergei and Julia Borisenkov had not set out to start their own church but soon they had about 60 people who wanted to become Christians but had no suitable church to attend. The Borisenkovs knew that the new converts would be put off by the excessive formalism and legalism in their own Pentecostal church, so, with the blessing of that Pentecostal church, the Borisenkovs started their own charismatic congregation. Their 'Cornerstone' church has now grown to become the largest Protestant church in the whole of Tatarstan.

The 'Cornerstone' church was seriously affected by the new restrictions because few privately owned halls are available for their use, and some of the owners of these may fear reprisals from Muslim organizations if they were to rent their halls to the churches. Until the Spring of 1995 the 'Cornerstone' church was able to use the Conference Hall belonging to the EVM electronics factory, which technically was still a state enterprise. They eventually had to move from these premises but are now able to rent a hall in another public building. In practice, therefore, it seems as if the authorities have actually been 'turning a blind eye' towards churches of whom they approve, but used the restrictions to suppress a cult which too conspicuously threatened the association between Islam and Tatar ethnic identity.

In eastern Tatarstan, similar restrictions were introduced in Naberezhnye-Chelny, where there are already five working mosques and the foundations have been laid for a new one which is to be the biggest in the former USSR. A Pentecostal church had been meeting in the largest cinema in the city, but the cinema was state property. By the summer of 1993, the cinema's director had been approached three times by Muslims asking him to deny the Christians the use of his premises, but he had refused to comply with their demands. In early November there was a press conference at which all the city's religious groups were represented—including the Russian Orthodox Church, Protestants, Muslims, Krishnaites and other religious groups. At the conference the mullah proposed that there should be friendly relationships between the religious groups and requested the others not to try to attract converts from among the Muslims. Shortly after this conference the local mayor issued his edict banning the use of public buildings by religious organizations. The Pentecostals therefore had to find a privately owned hall for their meetings.¹³

Naberezhnye-Chelny has a population of 508,000 people, of whom 206,000 are Tatars and another 9,600 are Bashkorts, together accounting for about 42 per cent of the population. More pressure against the Christians has been reported from the Mendeleyevsk region, where Muslims constitute about 54 per cent of the population. In June–July 1993 a Christian musical group from Odessa came to help with some meetings, one of which was disrupted by a gang (assumed to have come from the local Mafia) who threatened to break up the musical

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instruments if all those present did not leave within five minutes. They did not want Tatars to be influenced by Christianity.

In the nearby city of Nizhnyekamsk the Muslims account for about 47 per cent of the 192,000 population. Stepan Baranov, pastor of the city's Pentecostal church, reports that during the summer of 1993 a group of about 20 young people came into one of his meetings, watched for about five minutes and then left. Their presence appeared somewhat threatening but they did not try to disrupt the meeting overtly.

Early in 1994 Stepan was also threatened by the parents of a 17-year-old Tatar girl who had become a Christian and had been baptised in the summer of 1993. After this, her parents would not let her out of the house at the times when church services were being held. When they saw how she continued to be helped by the Christians, they threatened Stepan with 'something disastrous' if he continued to stay in the city.

Although the law which was enacted in Kazan' and Naberezhnye-Chelny was not passed also in Nizhnyekamsk, the local administration there has been putting pressure on a Baptist church founded by a Tatar named Tahir Talipov, who was converted from a Muslim background. In August 1994 Tahir's church in Nizhnyekamsk was closed down under the pretext that American visitors had violated some minor regulations. Unofficially, however, Tahir was told by an official in the local administration that the moves against him are because he is a Tatar who has converted to Christianity and his church is too active. He has tried to appeal to Kazan' to overturn the local decree on the closure of his church, but officials keep passing the responsibility back and forth between Kazan' and Nizhnyekamsk.

Therefore, in practice it seems as if conflicts between Muslims and Christians have been acute only when there have been conversions across the ethnic boundaries. Such conversions have challenged popular assumptions about Tatars being Muslims. As anthropologists have often pointed out, boundaries between categories are often the source of particular concern in many cultures. In the cases just described, ambiguities about those boundaries led to violent reactions in an effort to maintain symbols of ethnic identity.

Paganism in Tatarstan

Many new cults of an occult or 'New Age' type have also been flooding into the new Russian marketplace for religions and ideologies. However, some aspects of paganism are also indigenous and have a long history. There are some villages in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan where overt, explicit paganism has survived as an expression of ethnic identity.

The inhabitants of these villages are Udmurts. The main centre of Udmurt population is Udmurtia itself, on the northern borders of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. However, four centuries ago some Udmurts fled south and east away from the armies of Ivan the Terrible. These Udmurts wanted to preserve their pagan religion. Settling among the Muslim Tatars and Bashkorts, these Udmurts

clung more strongly to their paganism than did the Udmurts further north, who often adopted Russian Orthodoxy to at least some extent, sometimes alongside vestiges of paganism.

Among the Udmurts living in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan, paganism (rather than Christianity) became an important symbol of ethnic identity. Other markers of ethnicity were their styles of dress and their Finno-Ugric language, although they also began to use many Tatar loan words. Udmurts in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan also tended to encourage endogamous marriage with other Udmurts because Udmurt girls who married Tatars were normally expected to become Muslims and to bring up their children as Muslims.

In a number of instances, pagan and Christian elements have become inter-mixed. For instance, shortly after observing Orthodox rituals at Easter, some villagers pray to the pagan gods, asking that the coming summer would be blessed with a plentiful harvest, and that everybody in the family would be happy and healthy. Later, in the autumn, the men thank the gods of nature for having granted them a good harvest.

The day chosen for these rites can vary from one village to another, but people say that nowadays the rituals tend to be less elaborate than in the past. One relatively more complex ritual has survived in the Udmurt village of Varklend Bod'ya in the Agryz district of Tatarstan, where, in the course of a week-long annual festival, they pray each day to a different god. On the first day they offer prayers to the pagan High God and on subsequent days focus their attention in turn on the god of the earth, an evil god and also the spirits of those who have died, differentiating between those who died locally and those whose deaths occurred elsewhere. They offer meat and gruel on a fire, as burnt offerings, believing that in the smoke the offerings would ascend to the High God. By contrast, the offerings to the god of the earth are left in a hole in the ground.

The same village also holds a coming-of-age festival for young people aged between 15 and 17, when the whole village comes together and prays for divine blessings on the young people. The festival is held on separate days for the young men and the young women. However, in Udmurtia itself this custom seems to have disappeared.

Recently there has been a revival of some aspects of paganism among a small number of southern Udmurts within Udmurtia itself. For instance, in March 1994 I witnessed the re-enactment of a pagan rite which took place in the southern Udmurt village of Bol'shiye Siby.

For this ritual a group of local people—mainly older women, plus a few men and children—dressed up in traditional costume from their district of southern Udmurtia. The women wore red shawls and dresses intricately embroidered with traditional designs. On their chests they wore rows of coins, many of them dating back 50 to 100 years. For their footwear they wore the plaited birch bark sandals which had been widely worn in country areas until the 19th century. Such sandals were also worn by some of the men, whose other clothing consisted of more modern style shirts or jerkins.

This particular ritual was ostensibly performed on behalf of a deceased

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relative in order to help him to marry again in the next world. The Udmurts use the word 'wedding' to describe three kinds of unions which, they say, a person can undergo during the life cycle: the first of these is at birth, and is a 'wedding' to this world, the second takes place at marriage, and the third is after death—as a 'wedding' to the other world. However, rites connected with the third 'wedding' are condemned by the Russian Orthodox Church—to which many Udmurts also belong—because it is viewed as a kind of occultism which can make a person susceptible to demonic influences.

Prior to the commencement of the ritual, people gathered at the home of the deceased man and began to drink vodka together, offering glasses to one another to drink. Then the skull of a horse—representing the dead man—was brought out and placed in a kind of wooden barrel. On top of it and around it were then placed in turn various offerings of food, cloth or coins, expressing the idea that the person would need such things in the next world in order to marry again. The living wish the deceased to have contentment and a good marriage in the next world.

After this, the participants changed their dress, the women putting on men's hats and coats, and the men putting on women's headscarves and skirts over their trousers. This ceremonial transvestism was supposed to confuse evil spirits about the identity of the participants. The barrel containing the horse skull and offerings was then dragged on a sledge over the snow to a tall evergreen tree, symbolizing the passage from this world to the next. There the offerings and skull were burned, the smoke rising up in the air next to the tree as a kind of vehicle for conveying the offerings into the other world.

As the fire burned, people shared together in eating a kind of pastry and drinking vodka in memory of the deceased. Once the fire had died down and was doused, the children were encouraged to look among the ashes for the coins, which they retrieve. Finally, prayers were said—first to the pagan gods and then in the Russian Orthodox manner to the Christian God. The participants then returned to the house for a meal together and further mutual sharing of drinks.

The recent revival of paganism among the Udmurts and Mari is to a large extent an expression of national identity. After many decades of Russification, these peoples have lost many former symbols of ethnic distinctiveness. In the towns national dress is no longer worn except for special occasions and members of the younger generation often speak Russian better than Udmurt. Now that religion is no longer prohibited, some Udmurts are looking to the pre-Christian pagan faith of their ancestors as another vehicle for expressing their ethnic identity. They want to show that they are distinct from the Russians and that they have a national heritage, identity and traditions of their own. The same also applies to the Mari, another Finno-Ugric people in this region of Russia.

Concluding comments

In conclusion, it can be seen that religion is very often tied in with ethnic identity among these peoples, but to varying extents and with differing degrees

of intensity. There are both Christian and Muslim nationalists who feel that their ethnic group ought to belong to one particular religion. These are the ones who tend to be provoked by publicly known conversions which cross ethnic boundaries, especially those cases of Tatars having been converted to Christianity. Such conversions are a threat to ardent nationalists who believe it is important to maintain the symbols which preserve boundaries and thereby help to maintain ethnic identity.

A slightly different strategy was employed by the Udmurts living in Bashkortostan and Tatarstan, for whom paganism helped to preserve an ethnic identity in contrast to their Muslim neighbours. From a casual acquaintance with some of these supposedly 'pagan' Udmurts, I have the impression that paganism has now become more of a local tradition than a strongly-held belief system. Perhaps this is partly due to the prolonged influence of atheistic Communism.

The majority of people, however, are religiously indifferent, with a very 'nominal' allegiance to the religion of their ancestors. With the high degree of intermarriage between members of different ethnic groups, situations of conflict within a family can arise, as illustrated by the case of Dina, who resolved it by becoming a Baha'i.

One widespread legacy of Communism, however, is that many people find it easier to call themselves atheists than anything else. In this way, Communism has given an acceptable alternative form or religious (or non-religious) identity which is not linked with ethnic identity. It is neutral, and is not something to provoke religious conflict, so is therefore more convenient for most people. Nowadays it is more fashionable to attend a church or mosque on special occasions, but as a 'custom', devoid of any religious commitment. A good example of this is a family I know in Ufa, where the husband is Tatar and the wife is Bashkort. They do not regard themselves as in any way Christian, but for their daughter they put up a Christmas tree and made sure she had a visitation from Father Christmas.

Appendix: The geographical distribution of ethnic groups within Tatarstan.

The following statistics provide an overview of the ethnic composition of Tatarstan, focusing mainly on the indigenous peoples of the Volga-Ural region—omitting Ukrainians, Jews and other nationalities which make up the remainder of the total populations. Where populations are provided both for a city and for the surrounding district which has the same name—comparable to the difference in England between Cambridge and Cambridgeshire—the word *raion* is added for clarity. Within each *raion* the *raion* centre is likely to contain a wider mix of ethnic groups than local villages. At the village level, sometimes place names can give clues to the likely dominant ethnic composition of a settlement. An example is the village of Chuvashskii Brod, on the Malyi (small) Chereyshn river in southern Tatarstan (south-west of Chistopol'). Presumably it is a predominantly Chuvash settlement. However, a little to the west of it is a Tatar village—named Tatarskoe.

Table 1. Statistics on ethnic composition at the city and *raion* levels

Cities	Total	Tatars	Russians	Bashkorts	Chuvash	Mordvin	Udmurts	Mari
Kazan'	1,087,584	440,659	595,137	2,346	12,457	2,154	1,628	3,309
Naberezhnye Chelny	508,163	206,183	247,461	9,597	12,593	3,210	2,867	4,025
Nizhnyekamsk	192,525	89,438	88,801	1,913	5,780	1,116	684	766
Al'metevsk	137,382	70,615	57,247	587	3,134	3,133	158	141
Zelyenodol'sk	94,905	27,607	63,632	85	1,197	147	52	583
Bugul'ma	89,917	26,163	56,646	427	2,112	2,296	117	147
Chistopol'	65,277	19,716	42,925	29	1,399	440	28	32
Leninogorsk	61,901	24,391	27,817	244	3,965	4,291	44	50
Yelabuga	54,360	18,629	31,914	530	911	205	443	432
Zainsk	36,932	18,001	17,236	171	657	99	50	70
Aznakaevo	32,109	27,418	3,830	178	174	156	12	70
<i>Northern area (north of Kama and Volga rivers)—Raions</i>								
Agryz	39,370	23,407	9,844	211	125	35	2,515	2,894
Arsk	62,306	57,662	3,990	36	68	18	39	304
Baltasi	29,023	24,463	346	12	13	2	3,901	244
Bogatiye Sabi	42,958	39,865	2,639	39	35	12	186	10
Kymor	49,946	38,411	3,148	54	51	10	7,243	929
Laishevo	35,524	13,104	21,576	54	384	50	26	29
Mamadysh	50,548	36,626	12,249	30	54	14	662	707
Mendeleyevsk	26,478	14,152	9,414	210	177	30	1,068	1,074
Oktyabr'skiy	54,224	23,953	13,883	41	15,771	241	12	18
Ribnaya Sloboda	31,848	24,278	7,304	31	60	20	16	3
Visokaya Gora	52,310	29,485	21,684	54	432	65	46	106
Yelabuga Raion	9,999	3,735	5,622	15	62	7	61	430
Zelenodol'sk Raion	62,132	27,010	31,929	74	1,625	226	77	404

Western area (west of Volga river)—Raions

Apastovo	39,196	31,002	6,282	28	1,776	5	7	12
Buinsk	47,011	29,284	7,069	33	10,293	139	24	14
Drozhzhanoë	30,398	17,744	261	8	12,312	11	17	4
Kamskoye Ustye	18,860	9,288	9,075	9	113	185	6	24
Tetyushi Verkhiny	28,181	8,735	10,014	15	6,155	3,139	3	5
Uslon	19,967	4,086	14,100	9	1,478	32	16	19

Southern area (south of Kama, west of railway from Nizhnyekamsk to Leninogorsk)—Raions

Aksubaëvo	32,478	12,411	5,247	9	14,636	17	21	12
Alexeyevskoe	24,417	6,881	14,611	5	1,691	1,117	2	8
Cheremshan	21,789	11,343	4,120	12	4,888	1,335	12	1
Chistopol' Raion	22,225	12,667	8,013	4	1,307	139	6	19
Nizhnyekamsk Raion	35,502	16,049	17,149	204	1,149	142	95	67
Novoshesh-minsk	14,669	6,328	7,572	9	667	21	5	4

Eastern area (south of Kama, east of railway from Nizhnyekamsk to Leninogorsk)—Raions

Al'metevsk Raion	34,116	18,625	11,389	110	2,599	1,086	13	21
Aktanysh	32,656	31,484	179	277	7	7	6	654
Aznakaëvo Raion	28,077	22,785	4,286	117	317	160	15	59
Bavli	56,971	37,760	11,996	542	2,592	665	2,424	64
Bugul'ma Raion	20,049	9,007	8,516	161	1,303	706	57	42
Leninogorsk Raion	22,881	16,723	3,018	19	1,320	1,608	12	17
Menzelinsk	30,743	18,570	10,811	67	189	51	31	837
Muslyumovo	23,195	20,662	1,745	44	9	3	5	664
Sarmanovo	32,860	29,718	2,712	139	67	66	10	10
Zainsk Raion	15,855	11,964	3,473	21	305	7	1	4
Total all of Tatarstan	3,641,742	1,765,404	1,575,361	19,106	134,221	28,859	24,796	19,446

Table 2.

<i>Raions</i>	Total	Tatars	Russians	Bashkorts	Chuvash	Mordvin	Udmurts	Mari
Alkeyev	23,069	14,241	3,794	8	4,903	23	4	8
Pestrechinsk	28,568	15,495	12,626	24	124	21	21	36
Spasski	22,980	6,820	15,388	6	482	108	7	7
Tukayev	27,308	20,761	5,641	258	301	39	39	57

Problems of changed place names

The settlements of Bulgar, Nurlat and Bazarniye Matakı in the southern area of Tatarstan are listed as *Raion* centres on the current map but are not listed under these names in the 1989 census data available to me. In recent years, several places have reverted to their pre-Communist place names, but the information I have available to me lists places according to their names at the time of the 1989 census. Therefore I have unfortunately been unable to locate on the new map of Tatarstan some of the areas listed in the census data. These other districts are shown in Table 2.

Some of these place names might be equivalent to the settlements of Bulgar, Nurlat and Bazarniye Matakı, or else they might refer to different areas. South of Bugul'ma, in Eastern Tatarstan, there is a village called Spasskoe which is not currently a *Raion* centre, so I am hesitant to equate it with the Spasski listed above as a centre at the time of the last census. However, the larger settlement of Oktyab'rskiy, between Kazan' and Zelenodol'sk, is not identified as a *Raion* centre on the current map but I have assumed this is the Oktyab'rskiy mentioned in the census data and have therefore assigned it to the northern region. (I have found no other settlement of this name in Tatarstan, although there is one just outside the republic's borders in Bashkortostan.)

Notes and references

1. For instance, the Muslims refer to Jesus as 'Isa' but the 'Christianized' Tatars use the Russian form 'Iisus'.
2. Amir Taheri, *Crescent in a Red Sky: The Future of Islam in the Soviet Union* (London, Melbourne, Auckland, Johannesburg: Hutchinson, 1989), pp 67, 79.
3. Ibid, p 67; Shirin Akiner, *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union* (London, New York, Sydney and Melbourne: Kegan Paul International, revised edition, 1986), pp 58–59; Azade-Ayse Rorlich, *The Volga Tatars: A Profile in National Resilience* (Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), pp 88–115.
4. Quoted during an interview for a BBC Radio 4 programme broadcast at 7.20 pm on 3 December 1991.
5. Of course, to be officially defined as Tatar for passport purposes does mean that they have at least some kind of Tatar ancestry.
6. G. A. Komarova, *Etnicheskie ustanovki pri vybore brachnovo partnera (po materialam sluzhby brachnykh ob'javlenii v Ufe i Cheboksarakh)* (Ethnic Arrangements in the Choice of Marriage Partner—Based on Materials of the Service of Marriage Advertisements in Ufa and Cheboksary), in *Sovetskaiia Etnografiia*, No 3, Moscow, 1987, pp 80–90, cited in *The Central Asian Newsletter*, Vol 7, No 1, April 1988, pp 8–9. (However, one problem in interpreting these figures concerns the social acceptability among each ethnic group of finding a spouse through advertisements. It is possible that Russians view this as a 'last resort' and are therefore less particular about their choice of preferred partner than are Tatars whose Muslim backgrounds might, to some extent, make arranged marriages more acceptable. Therefore caution needs to be exercised in the use of such statistics as indicating anything about the strength of a national consciousness among Tatar men and women.)
7. Figures cited on a BBC Radio 4 programme broadcast at 7.20 pm on 3 December 1991.
8. See also David C. Lewis, 'Baha'is—Healing Divisions?', in *Frontier* (published by the Keston Institute, Oxford), April–June 1992, p 17.
9. See also David C. Lewis, 'Divided we stand', in *Frontier* (published by the Keston Institute, Oxford), April–June 1992, pp 8–9.
10. David C. Lewis, 'Rival muftis in Tatarstan', in *Frontier* (published by the Keston Institute, Oxford), July–September 1994, p 12.
11. See David C. Lewis, 'From hippy to priest', in *Frontier*, January–March 1993 (published by the Keston Institute, Oxford), pp 19–20.

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12. See David Lewis, 'God's anointed', in *Frontier*, April-June 1993 (published by the Keston Institute, Oxford), pp 26-27.
13. See also David C. Lewis, 'Christian groups seek places of worship in Tatar region', in *Frontier*, July-September 1994, p 13.